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Abstract - We study an imitation game of strategic complementarities between the percentage of 
high-skilled workers and innovative firms, namely, human capital and R&D, respectively. We show 
that this model has two pure Nash equilibria, one of them with high investment in R&D and skilled 
workers while the other one, which we interpret as poverty trap, exhibits lack of skills and 
underinvestment. Furthermore, we show that we can avoid the poverty trap if the number of 
innovative firms is larger than a threshold value allowing an increment of the number of skilled 
workers. 
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Nelson and Phelps (1966) o⁄er a ￿rst attempt at modeling the idea that the ma-
jor role of education is to increase the individual￿ s capacity to innovate and to
adapt to new technologies, thereby speeding up technological di⁄usion through-
out the economy. This approach provides a couple of interesting insights. First,
the level of education attainment is more important than the rate of growth
of human capital accumulation (as in Lucas (1988)). Second, the marginal
productivity of education attainment is an increasing function of the rate of
technological progress. Then, macroeconomic policies which a⁄ect rates of in-
novation and investment will a⁄ect the relative demand for workers according
to their education levels1. In this vein, Azariadis (1996) shows that the initial
level of technology is critical for economic growth. In other words, if a coun-
try starts above this threshold level of technology, it will follow a sustained
path of economic growth. However, if the country￿ s technology level is too low,
there will be no R&D and the economy will remain in a poverty trap of zero
growth.2 This approach emphasizes on the role of innovation, in particular that
its absence leads to stagnation.
In this paper we deal with imitation factors resulting in performing a wide
spectrum of tasks ￿as others do￿ . In the model we assume that all agents in
the population are in￿nitely lived and interact forever. Each agent sticks to
some pure strategy for some time interval and now and then she reviews her
strategy, sometimes resulting in a change of strategy (see Weibull, 1995). On
imitation theory, Vega-Redondo (1997) and Schlag (1998, 1999) pointed out two
approaches based on the idea that individual who face repeated choice problems
will imitate others who obtained high payo⁄s. But despite this basic similarity,
the two models di⁄er along two di⁄erent dimensions, the informational structure
("whom agents imitate") and the behavioral rule ("how agents imitate"). While
agents in Vega-Redondo￿ s model observe their immediate competitors, in Schlag
model they observe others who are just like them but play in di⁄erent groups
against di⁄erent opponents. It can be show that the di⁄erence between the two
models is mainly due to the di⁄erent informational assumptions rather than the
di⁄erent adjustment rules. So, it is more important whom one imitates than
how imitates (see, J. Apesteguia et al., 2007).
In seeking an intentional explanation of imitative behavior, we must search
for possible (good) reasons for individuals to imitate others, and only if this
endeavor fails should we resort to explanations which assume that actors act
instinctually, randomly, or what not. In this sense, a rational imitation can be
explained as follows. An actor, A, can be said imitate the behavior of another
actor, B, when observation of the behavior of B a⁄ects A in such a way that A￿ s
subsequent behavior becomes more similar to the observed behavior of B. An
1On human capital and growth theory, the main statement, both in Lucas (1988) and
Stokey (1991), is that human capital is the ￿engine￿of growth. Similar claims can be found
in Mankiw et al., (1992) and Barro (1991).
2Azariadis and Starchurski (2005) de￿ne poverty traps as ￿any self-reinforcing mechanism
which causes poverty to persist￿.
1actor can be said to act rationally when the actor, faced with a choice between
di⁄erent courses of action, chooses the course of action that is best with respect
to the actor￿ s interests and her beliefs about possible action opportunities and
their e⁄ects. Rational imitation hence refers to a situation where an actor
acts rationally on the basis of beliefs that have been in￿ uenced by observing
the past choices of others. To the extent that other actors act reasonably and
avoid alternatives that have proven to be inferior, the actor can arrive at better
decisions that he or she would make otherwise, by imitating the behavior of
others.
The aim of this paper is to study an imitation game where the nature of
interactions among individuals creates a potential for multiple equilibria. These
equilibria are characterized by di⁄erent levels of "activity" (skill workers, in-
novative ￿rms) in the economy. To the best of our knowledge, this is the ￿rst
time that imitation theory is used to explain poverty traps. We show that this
model has two Nash equilibria, one of them with high investment in R&D and
the presence of high-skilled workers while the other exhibits low investment and
skill levels. Hence the possibility of these two kinds of equilibria show that the
players, ￿rms and workers, acting under identical settings may perform either
well or badly (i.e. grow or stagnate), depending only on the initial conditions.
The state (￿high￿or ￿low￿ ) that a given country may attain depends on the
performance and the interactions between two populations, namely those of
￿rms and workers. The investment in R&D is successful only in the presence
of high-skilled workers (Aghion and Howitt, 1999). Conversely, the workers in-
crease their skills when a large number of ￿rms invest in high-technology. On
the contrary, ￿rms that do not invest in R&D, do not look for high-skilled work-
ers, making the accumulation of skills unpro￿table. We show that there exist a
threshold number of innovative ￿rms, above which it becomes advantageous to
accumulate high skills. This is the mechanism that allows avoiding a poverty
trap.
In fact, education (human capital accumulation) is a necessary but insu¢ -
cient condition for sustained economic growth. In many developing countries, a
huge e⁄ort in generating a quality educational system did not have an impact
on the performance of the economy. For instance, several decades ago Uruguay
has invested heavily in public education, in order to generate a highly-skilled
workforce. But this e⁄ort was not accompanied by a similar investment by the
￿rms in R&D. This happened because Uruguay was a closed country and there
was not competitiveness. After this failed attempt the outlays in education
decreased, since high wages were not correlated with time spent in schooling
(Ros, 2001). This trend deepened after the Uruguayan economy became more
open. For another example, the ￿rms using high technology in Mexico are
foreign-owned (the so called maquiladoras) that import their technology, which
is developed abroad, and contract in Mexico only low-skilled workers. There-
fore, these ￿rms lack R&D departments in Mexico and do not create incentives
to increase the skills of their local workforce.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the coordination game
which represents a contractual situation among ￿rms and potential workers.
2Section 3 presents the dynamic imitation model in which the imitative behavior
can lead the economy into a poverty trap. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 The Game
Consider an economy with two populations: potential workers, W, and ￿rms,
F. Each population has two clubs:
￿ The W-population has an S-club of strategists that invest in improving
their individual skills (high-skill workers), and an NS-club that does not3.
￿ The F-population has the I-club of strategists that invest in R&D (inno-
vative ￿rms), and the NI-club of no-innovative ￿rms.
Workers do not know the type of the ￿rm. On the contrary, workers have
to certify their skill levels. A S-type strategist worker may invest in education
going to a training school, at an associated cost C. This worker gets a salary ￿ s
both in an I or NI ￿rm. Instead, the NS-type workers get a salary s < ￿ s.
Assume that the innovative ￿rm I shares utilities with their workers, each
one receiving a premium. NI-￿rms do not share its bene￿ts. High-skilled
workers receive a premium ￿ p and low-skilled ones p, (0 < p < ￿ p):
3Let I = (1;:::;n) be the set of worker positions, ordered by their skill levels, fS;NSgi
the pure-strategies of the worker in position i, Mi its mixed-strategy simplex, and M =
￿i2IMi the polyhedron of mixed-strategy pro￿les. Let mis denote the mixed-strategy pro￿le
corresponding to S .
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where Bi(j); 8 i 2 fI;NIg j 2 fS;NSg; is the gross-bene￿t of the i￿￿rm
hiring a j￿worker.
The expected payo⁄of a S-type strategist worker, given the chances of being
hired either by an I or a NI ￿rm, is:
E(S) = prob(I)[￿ s + ￿ p] + prob(NI)(￿ s) ￿ C (1)
where prob(I) represents the probability of being contracted by an innovative
￿rm and prob(NI) the probability of being hired by a non-innovative ￿rm.
Analogously:
E(NS) = prob(I)[s + p] + prob(NI)(s) (2)
A worker prefers to be a S-type strategist when E(S) > E(NS), and recipro-
cally. This happen if and only if prob(I) is large enough i.e.:
prob(I) >
C ￿ (￿ s ￿ s)
(￿ p ￿ p)
. (3)
Consider the following remarks:
4￿ Gross-bene￿ts obtained by an innovative ￿rm contracting a high-skilled
worker are higher than those obtained by a non-innovative ￿rm contracting
the same worker, i.e.: BI(S) ￿ ￿ p > BNI(S).
￿ The gross-bene￿ts of a innovative ￿rm contracting high-skilled workers
are higher than those of a non-innovative ￿rm contracting a non-skilled
worker, i.e.: BI(S) ￿ ￿ p > BNI(NS)
￿ If the ￿rm is innovative, the payo⁄ of a high-skilled worker is larger than
the payo⁄ of a non-skilled worker, i.e.: ￿ s + ￿ p ￿ C > s + p:
￿ If the ￿rm is non-innovative, the payo⁄ of non-skilled worker is at least as
good as the payo⁄ of a high-skilled worker, i.e.: ￿ s ￿ C ￿ s:
￿ If the worker is non-skilled, the bene￿ts of non-innovative ￿rm are higher
than those of innovative one, i.e.: BI(NS) ￿ (s + p) < BNI(NS) ￿ s.
This game has two pure strategy Nash equilibria: A = fS;Ig and B =
fNS;NIg, and a mixed strategy equilibrium. While equilibrium A Pareto-
dominates B, in particular, the risk dominant equilibrium is fNS;NIg while
the payo⁄ dominant equilibrium is clearly fS;Ig.
In the sequel, prob(I) = PI = QI=Q where QI is the number of innovative
￿rms, and Q is total number of ￿rms. Then, prob(NI) = PNI = 1 ￿ PI.
3 Dynamic Imitation
We consider the ￿behavioral rule with inertia￿(see Schlag, 1999) that allows
an individual to reconsider his action only with probability R 2 (0;1) in each
round. Each round is ￿nished at the end of the contractual situation, and then
workers may ask themselves whether to change or not their behavior according
to what the others are doing. Consider the i-strategist worker, i 2 fS;NSg.
With probability Ri, she will ask herself whether to change or not her behavior.
Then, Ri denotes the average time-rate at which an individual worker, that
currently uses strategy i 2 fS;NSg, reviews her strategy choice.
Likewise, let Pij be the probability that such a reviewing worker will change
to strategy j 6= i. Then,
P(i ! j) = RiPij,
is the probability that a worker in the i ￿ th club changes to the j ￿ th club.4
Let eS = (1;0) and eNS = (0;1) indicate the pure strategies, S or NS:With this
4In a ￿nite population one may imagine that review times of the S-strategists in population
W are modeled as the arrival times of a Poisson process with average (across such individu-
als) arrival rate RS, and that at each such arrival time the individual selects a pure strategy
according to the conditional probability distribution PSNS. Assuming that all individuals￿
Poisson processes are statistically independent, the probability that any two individuals hap-
pen to review simultaneously is zero, and the aggregate of reviewing time in the W player
population among S-strategists is a Poisson process. If strategy choices are statistically in-
dependent random variables, the aggregate arrival rate of the Poisson process of individuals
who switch from one pure strategy S to another NS is RSPSNS.
5speci￿cation we can model the ￿ ow of high-skilled workers, _ XS, being equal to
the number of changing non-skilled workers minus the number of high-skilled
workers changing to the non-skilled worker￿ s club. Since we consider large popu-
lations, we invoke the law of large numbers and model these aggregate stochastic
processes as deterministic ￿ ows, each such ￿ ow being set equal to the expected
rate of the corresponding Poisson arrival process. Rearranging terms, one ob-
tains the system of di⁄erential equations that characterizes the dynamic ￿ ow of
workers:
_ XS = RNSPNSSXNS ￿ RSPSNSXS
_ XNS = ￿ _ XS
(4)
being XS the fraction of high-skilled workers and XNS the fraction of non-skilled
workers.
Let us give the following de￿nition on the notion of imitative behavior.
De￿nition. Dynamics (4) represent an imitative behavior if two pure strate-
gies fS;NSg that currently have the same expected payo⁄, but NS is currently
more popular than S in the sense that more individuals use NS, then the choice
probability for NS, PSNS should exceed that of S, PNSS.
An evaluation rule that seems particularly natural in a context of simple
imitation is the ￿average rule￿ where each strategy is evaluated according to
the average payo⁄ observed in the reference group (see J. Apesteguia et al.,
2007). Although a worker does not know all the true values of the payo⁄ of
the other workers, she can take a sample of true values in order to estimate the
average. Let ￿ E(i) and ￿ E(j) be the estimators for the true values E(i) and E(j).
Hence, each i￿worker changes her strategy if and only if ￿ E(i) < ￿ E(j).
Therefore, the probability that an i￿strategist becomes a j￿strategist is
given by P[ ￿ E(j) ￿ ￿ E(i) > 0], and (4) can be written as:
_ XS = RNSP[ ￿ E(NS) ￿ ￿ E(S) < 0]XNS ￿ RSP[ ￿ E(NS) ￿ ￿ E(S) > 0]XS;
_ XNS = ￿ _ XS:
(5)
Suppose that the P[ ￿ E(j) ￿ ￿ E(i) > 0] increases proportionally to the true
value E(j), i.e.:




￿E(j) if E(j) > 0
0 if E(j) ￿ 0
(6)
where ￿ = 1
jE(NS)+E(S)j. Recall, E(NS) = (PI)(p) + s ￿ 0; but E(S) =
(PI)(￿ p) + ￿ s ￿ C can be positive or negative, depending on the value of PI and
C: Then, system (4) takes the form:
_ XS = ￿
￿
RNS￿E(S) + RS( 1
￿ ￿ E(S))
￿
XS + RNS￿E(S): (i)
_ XNS = ￿ _ XS: (ii)
(7)
6Let us assume a constant number of innovative ￿rms, and that salaries,
premiums and education costs are ￿xed. Then, E(S) and E(NS) are constant.
The following cases apply:
Case 1: If E(S) > 0 then, the equation (7(i)) takes the form:
_ XS = AXS + RNS[E(S) + E(NS)]E(S) (8)
where:
A = E3(S)RNS + E2(S)[2E(NS)RNS ￿ RS] +
+E(S)[E2(NS)RNS ￿ E(NS)RS] + RS
and the solution of the di⁄erential equation (8) has the form:
XS(t) = XS0e￿At + [RNS￿E(S)]t
where XS0 is the fraction of the high-skill workers at time t = 0. It follows
that its solution depends on the number of innovative ￿rms. Since E(S) =
(PI)(￿ p) + ￿ s ￿ C and E(NS) = (PI)(p) + s, the respective values of E(S)
and E(NS) are increasing functions of the percentage of innovative ￿rms PI.
However if PI > Pu then E(S) increases faster than E(NS) as PI increases,
see equations (2) and (1).
For instance, consider two countries, 1 and 2, where the respective percentage
of innovative ￿rms are: PI1 > PI2, so, looking at the solution it follows that
the population of high-skilled workers in country 1 is for each t > tu larger than
the population of high-skilled workers in country 2, i.e., X1S(t) > X2S(t); where
the value of tu depends on the parameters of the model, salaries, premiums and
probabilities of reviewing workers5.
For another example assume that E(S) = (￿ p)P(I) + ￿ s ￿ C < 0: Then,
equation (7 (i)) takes the form:
_ XS = ￿RS￿E(NS)XS:
Hence, the population of high-skilled workers decreases.
Note that there exists a threshold value for the innovative ￿rms
pu =
C ￿ ￿ s
￿ p
such that, if PI > pu the population of high-skilled workers is increasing.
The next proposition summarizes our main result.
Proposition 1 There exists a threshold value, pu = C￿￿ s
￿ p ; such that if the initial
number of innovative ￿rms PI is larger than this value, PI > pu; then the
relative population of high-skilled workers increases. Otherwise, this percentage
decreases. As PI increases, E(S) increases faster than E(NS).
5Note that if A > 0 then _ Xs(t) > 0 for all t > ￿
RNS￿E(S)
A :
7The higher the number of innovative ￿rms, the greater the expected payo⁄
a high-skilled worker will get (it increases the number of high-skilled workers
by imitation) in the economy. As the pro￿ts of innovative ￿rms increase with
the percentage of high-skilled workers, then if at some time t = t0 the number
of innovative ￿rms satis￿es PI > pu it follows that the percentage of skilled
workers increases. It would then be rational for the ￿rms to be innovative,
obtaining higher bene￿ts. The percentage of innovative ￿rms would increase
with the percentage of high-skilled workers. Then, the economy would go to the
high level equilibrium. Instead, if PI < pu, we obtain a poverty trap, where
￿rms will be no-innovate and workers will remain with low skills.
4 Conclusion
As Accinelli et al. (2007) we obtained that to overcome a poverty trap it is
necessary to surpass a threshold number of innovative ￿rms. Then workers
will have incentives to improve their skills. Firms, in turn, can obtain more
bene￿ts being I￿type strategists. If this threshold value is not reached by the
economy, a policy maker should implement an incentive to reach the high-level
equilibrium of innovative ￿rms and high-skilled workers in the economy, for
instance, a policy intended to lower the cost of attaining skills. More generally,
the goal is to reduce the threshold value, pu.
Future research indicates that the number of innovative ￿rms should be an
increasing function of the number of high-skilled workers PI = f(XS), f0(￿) > 0.
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